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This paper studies the effects of several irritants to foreign direct investment, including
taxes, capital controls and corruption. Moreover, it investigates  whether corruption provides
international investors relief from taxes and capital controls they face in host countries.
There  are a  large number of  excellent papers  that  study the effect of taxation  on
international direct investment (e.g., Altshuler, Grubert, Newlon, 1998; and papers in the
book by Feldstein, Hines and Hubbard, 1995). Corruption has recently attracted increased
attention not only  from academics but  also from international financial institutions,  as
exemplified by the International Monetary Fund's  (IMF) decision to condition its loans to
Kenya on the latter's  effort to reduce corruption.  Using data on outward investment from
the United States, Hines (1995) found that American firms invest less in more corrupt host
countries, and he interpreted it as the effect of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Using
a sample of bilateral investment from fourteen major source countries to 45 host countries,
Wei (1997a,  1997b) found that all major source countries invest less in more corrupt
countries. Later, Hines (1999) found that capital controls have a statistically significant and
negative effect on inward foreign investment.  These papers have studied the effects of
corruption and capital controls in isolation, but not in an integrated framework.
Furthermore, a separate strand in the literature (e.g., Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; and
Lui, 1985) sees virtue in corruption.  In particular, in an environment with excessive tax,
severe  capital  control,  or  numerous  licensing  requirements, bribery  allows  firms  to
circumvent these otherwise suffocating regulatory burdens.  So, holding the level of tax and
capital controls constant, more bribes may lead to more foreign (and domestic) investment.
This argument may be characterized  as a theory of "efficient grease  payments."  On the other
hand, if regulatory burdens are endogenously chosen by the bureaucrats solely to extract
rents,  one  may  see  more  regulatory  burdens  in  countries with  more  corruption  (see
Kaufrnann and Wei, 1999, for a formal model and some firm-level evidence).  Therefore,
whether corruption in a host country with high tax rates and severe capital controls is
responsible for more or less foreign investment is an open question, the answer to which
depends on the degree to which taxes and capital controls are erected and maintained for
rent-seeking purposes.  Earlier papers have not investigated possible interactions between
corruption and taxation, and between corruption and capital controls. This paper tries to fill
this void.
Using data over a large number of source-host pairs, this study quantifies the importance
of a number of economic and non-economic factors that may affect international direct
investment.  It compares these effects with that of corporate income taxation whenever
possible.  Most importantly, it examines whether bribery in countries with high tax rates and
severe capitals control tends to encourage inward foreign direct investment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set.  Section 3 discusses
the statistical analyses and interpretations.  Section 4 concludes.
22. Data
Bilateral International Direct Investment
The dependent variable is (a transformation of) bilateral stocks of foreign investment in
1991 from fourteen major source countries to 45 host countries. The list of source countries
includes the seven largest in the world: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom,  and the United  States.  The number of the host countries in  the sample is
constrained by the joint  availability of data on tax rates, corruption levels and capital
controls.  The  data  come  from  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and
Development (OECD) database on international direct investment.
Tax
The host countries' tax rates are 1989 values.  It is worth noting that tax rates do not
change very much during  1989-91.  The actual measure is the smaller of two numbers
(whenever both are available): the statutory marginal tax rate on foreign corporations as
reported by Price Waterhouse (1990), or the actual average tax rate paid by the foreign
subsidiaries of American firms in that country. The data on 28 of the host countries are taken
from Desai and Hines (1996, Appendix 2). The rest are obtained using the Price Waterhouse
source with the able assistance of Mihir Desai.
Corruption
The empirical work in the paper utilizes two measures of corruption. The first is the
Business International (BI) index, which is based on surveys during 1980-83, and ranks
countries from one to ten, according to "the degree to which business transactions involve
corruption or questionable  payments." The data was provided by Paolo Mauro and was used
it in his paper (1995) on corruption and economic growth. The second source is the index
composed by Transparency International (TI)-an  agency dedicated to fighting corruption
worldwide.  The TI index is an average of ten surveys by different agencies over a number
of years.  It has an advantage and a disadvantage relative to the BI-index. On the one hand,
assuming measurement errors in different surveys are independent, the averaging process of
the TI index may produce smaller measurement errors in the end.  On the other hand,
different surveys cover different sets of countries and may use different criteria, so the
ratings on different countries in the TI index may be less comparable.  Fortunately, the two
indexes are highly correlated (with a correlation coefficient of 0.88).  Which index to use
makes no qualitative difference for subsequent discussions. Hence, later sections will only
report results with the BI index.
In both original sources, the indexes are defined so that a high number means low
corruption.  To avoid awkwardness in interpretation, I have rescaled them so that a large
number means more corruption.
3Capital Controls
There are two capital control measures. The first is a survey-based  measure from
Business  International,  collected  over 1980-83. In the original  survey,  a big number  (say,
ten) means less restriction  on capital  account. I have  re-scaled  them so that a large number
means more  restrictions.  This  measure  is supposed  to be on a one  to ten scale. In the sample,
the minimum  and maximum  are one and eight,  respectively.  This measure  is used in Hines
(1999). The second measure is a dummy  based on IMF's Exchange  Arrangements  and
Exchange Restrictions. The two measures  have a correlation  coefficient  of 0.46.  This
version of the paper only reports  the results  using the BI measure.
Other  Data
The GDP data comes from the Intemational  Monetary  Fund's International  Financial
Statistics  database. In a few cases  where GDP data are not available,  GNP data are used
instead.
The bilateral  distance  data  measures  the "greater  circle  distance"  between  the economic
centers  in source-host  pairs. The dummy  variable  measure  of linguistic  ties takes the value
of one if the source and host share a common  language  (either English,  French,  Spanish,
Gennan,  Arabic,  Chinese,  Japanese,  Portuguese  or Italian)  and  zero  otherwise.  Both data  are
taken from Frankel, Stein  and Wei (1995).
Four additional  potential  irritants  to foreign  investment  are: (1) restrictions  on foreign
firms' access  to domestic  capital  markets,  (2) restrictions  on their abilities to set up joint
ventures with domestic firms, (3) restrictions  on their abilities to bid on public sector
projects,  and (4) restrictions  on their corporate  control  rights. The paper uses four binary
measures (dummies)  for the four irritants. They are all survey  responses of subjective
perceptions  from the 1997 Global  Competitiveness  Report.
Table 1 reports  summary  statistics  on some  of the key variables.  The average  corruption
level (BI-Index)  is 3.70 (on a one-to-ten  scale). The average  degree  of capital  control  (BI-
Index) is 3.31 (on a one-to-ten  scale). And  the average  tax rate in the sample  is 34 percent.
4Table 1: Summary Statistics
Number
Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max.  Skewness  Kurtosis  of obs.
Corruption
BI-Index  3.70  2.49  1  10  0.75  -0.20  45
TI-Index  4.55  2.63  1  10  0.42  -1.02  42
Tax  0.34  0.12  0.02  0.55  -0.69  0.42  45
Capital account restrictions
(BI index)  3.31  2.06  1  8  0.75  -0.49  44
(IMF index)  0.64  0.48  0  1  -0.61  -1.64  42
Political
Stability  7.93  1.17  5  10  -0.56  -0.31  45
Red tape  4.34  2.30  1  9  0.15  -1.05  45
Pairwise  correlation  matrix
(40 observations)
C(BI)  C(TI)  Tax  KA-res (BI)  KA-res (IMF)  Stability
Corruption(BI)  1
Corruption(TI)  0.88  1
Tax  0.20  0.28  1
KA-res(BI)  0.47  0.48  0.42  1
KA-res(IMF)  0.23  0.22  0.18  0.46  1
Political stability  -0.69  -0.65  -0.11  -0.46  -0.28
Red tape  0.88  0.85  0.33  0.59  0.27  1
Corruption (BI-Index) = 11  - original BI-index score
Corruption (TI-Index) = 10 - original TI-index score
Capital controls (BI-Index) = 11 - original BI-index score
Red tape = 11- original index from BI.
3. Statistical  Analyses
One could run an Ordinary Least Square specification of the following sort
ln(FDIi,j)  = Xi,j  + U.j
where FDIj is the stock of foreign investrnent from source country i to host countryj,  and
Xis  a vector of regressors including the host country's  GDP in logarithm and the distance
between the source and host countries in logarithm. Experience indicates that, in analogy
to the gravity specification on trade flows, the logarithmic transformation on both sides of
the equation (of the dependent variable and of most of the regressors), called double-log
linear specification, produces the best functional fit.
Many host countries receive no direct investment from some source countries. A serious
drawback of the double-log linear specification is that zero FDI observations are dropped by
this specification. It is natural to think about using a Tobit specification to replace the OLS.
The problem there is that the simple Tobit specification conflicts with the double-log
transformnation,  as log of zero is not defined. To deal with this problem, I employ the
5following specification in this paper:
ln(FDIU  + A) = X,B  + uij  if X/3 + uu > ln(A)
= ln(A)  if X,B +  uij < ln(A)
where A is a threshold parameter to be estimated. u is an i.i.d. normal variate with mean
zero and variance c2. In this specification,  if X,B+u  exceeds a threshold value, ln(A), source
country i accumulates a positive stock of investment in host country  j; otherwise, the realized
foreign investment is zero (and the desired level could be negative).
This  framework is modified in subsequent implementation to become a quasi-fixed
effects specification: there are source country dummies, but no host country dummies.  The
source country dummies are intended to capture source-country-specific differences in the
stock  of  bilateral  direct  investment.  Such  differences  include  the  size  and  level  of
development of the source countries, and possibly different definitions of outward direct
investment used by different source countries (under the assumption that the FDI amount
under one definition is proportional to the amount under another definition plus an i.i.d.
random error).  Host country dummies are not included as there are no reliable measures of
year-to-year variations in corruption and capital controls, which are key variables for this
paper.
Empirical Results: Continuous Measures
To get some idea of quantitative importance of corruption levels and tax rates, I have
implemented a very simple specification. The two key regressors are tax rate and average
corruption level (BI index).  In addition, the estimating equation includes source country
dummies, host country's GDP in logarithm, distance between the source and host countries
in logarithm, and a dummy indicating if the source and host countries share a common
language.  The last two regressors are motivated by recent emphasis on the importance of
networks in trade and investment as in the work of Rauch (1996).
Table  I  presents the basic results.  In Column 1 which has the most parsimonious
specification, both tax rate and corruption measure have negative and statistically significant
coefficients. A one step increase in corruption  rating is associated with an increase in the tax
rate by 4.69 percentage points.' For instance, an increase in corruption level from that of
Singapore (with a BI corruption rating of 1) to that of Colombia (with a BI corruption rating
of 6.5) is equivalent to raising the tax rate by 25.8 percentage points. 2 Similarly, an increase
' 0.09/(0.01 x 1.92) = 4.69.
2 (6.5 - 1) x 4.69=25.8.
6in the average corruption level from that of Singapore  to that of Mexico (with a BI corruption
rating of 7.25) is equivalent to raising the tax rate by 29.3 percentage points.'
We note that all three control variables have statistically significant coefficients and
sensible signs. A host country with a larger GDP attracts more FDI than otherwise. A host
country that  is closer to  the source country either geographically  or linguistically (or
historically related) also attracts more inward investment than otherwise.
A measure of severity of capital controls (by the BI-index) is added in Column 2. This
variable has a negative sign and is statistically different from zero. Because countries that
impose  capital controls  and those  that have high  taxes tend to  be  correlated  (with  a
correlation coefficient of 0.40 according to Table 1), the coefficient on the tax variable
declines a bit (from -1.92  to-1.62)  but remains statistically significant.  Taking the point
estimates literally, a one-step increase in the severity of capital controls is equivalent to
raising the marginal tax rate by 13.2 percentage points [=0.14/(0.01 x 1.06)].  An increase
in the severity of capital controls from the Singapore level (BI-index value of 1) to the
Philippines level (BI-index level of 4) is equivalent to raising the marginal tax rate by 39.6
percent.
So far, we have considered the effects of tax, corruption and capital control in isolation.
Again, a popular (and previously untested) argument is that bribes can sometimes function
as "grease payments," helping firms by effectively reducing tax burden or evading capital
controls. If the "grease payment" effect works in reality, then, the same level of tax should
be a lesser hindrance to foreign investment in countries with greater possibility of bribing
officials.
Alternatively, the "grease payment" argument inay have no merit.  Kauflnann and Wei
(1999) argue that regulatory burdens, such as those imposed by taxes and capital controls
may well be endogenous, implemented by corruption-prone officials in order to extract
bribes. In other words, bribes mnight  reduce taxes only in a partial equilibrium story in which
the tax rate is pre-determined.  But in a general equilibrium, taxes may in fact be higher in
corrupt countries so that firms there do not end up paying fewer taxes (or facing less severe
capital controls).
We now check this possibility.  We first add a new termn  to the regression, "Corruption
x Tax-rate."  The efficient grease theory implies that the coefficient on this interactive term
should be  positive.  Column  3 reports  the  regression  with  the  new  interactive  term,
"Corruption x tax-rate."  As it happens, the corresponding coefficient does not differ from
zero statistically (though it is positive). Hence, there is no statistical support for the "grease
payment" argument; foreign investors' sensitivity to host tax rate does not seem to diminish
as the host country gets more corrupt.
The "efficient grease" argument is equally applicable to capital controls, so one may ask:
does greater corruption in a host country make the same degree of capital controls more
tolerable to foreign investors? To investigate this question, we augment the specification in
Column 2 with a different interactive term, "Corruption x Capital-Control."  The result is
3 (7.25 - 1) x 4.69=29.3.
7reported as Column 4 of Table 1. The coefficient turns out to be positive and statistically
significant. This literally means that the sensitivity of FDI to the severity of capital controls
is indeed less for more corrupt host countries. This seems to support the "grease payment"
hypothesis as applied to capital controls.
On the other hand, this result does not imply that foreign investors would necessarily
invest more in a more corrupt host country.  Consider two host countries with identical
capital controls (say, Capital Control Indexes = 4, approximately the mean in the sample, of
which the Philippines and Ecuador would be examples). If country A is more corrupt than
country B (say, the Corruption Indexes are 9 and 7 respectively), the net effect of this
increment in corruption on FDI is still negative, since (9-7)X(-0.12) + (9-7)X4XO.021  =  -
0.072.
Empirics:  Binary Measures of Corruption and Capital Controls
In the previous subsection, we measure capital controls and corruption on a one-to-ten
scale.  Since  these  measures  come  from  survey  of  respondents'  impressions,  small
measurement errors can easily change the ranking of host countries.  In this subsection, we
eliminate the overly fine gradation of the capital  control and  corruption measures by
constructing corresponding binary measures.  Specifically, we define D(Corruption) as a
dummy that takes the value of one if the Corruption Index exceeds six and zero otherwise.
Similarly, we define D(Cap-Control) to be a dummy for countries whose Capital Control
Index exceeds six. 4
Table 3 replicates all the regressions in Table 2, after replacing the ten-step measures of
corruption and capital controls by their binary counterparts.  In Columns  1 and 2, tax,
corruption, and capital control, individually still have a negative and statistically significant
effect on inward foreign investment. Other things being equal, foreign investors invest less
in a country with higher tax, more corruption, or more severe capital controls.
The last three columns show the interactions between corruption and tax rates, and
between corruption and capital controls. In Column 3 where only the former interaction is
shown, the coefficient on the regressor, "D(Corruption) x Tax-rate," is negative.  As in the
regressions reported in Table 2, this finding is contrary to the hypothesis that "grease-
payments" make taxes less irritating to investors.  In Column 4 where the interaction term
"D(Corruption) x D(Cap-Control)" is added alone, the coefficient on the term is positive but
not statistically different from zero at the ten percent level.  In fact, even if one takes the
point estimate as given, the estimates suggest that investors will unambiguously invest less
in a more corrupt country whether it has tight or loose capital controls. This differs from the
earlier observation in Table 2 that bribes may reduce the negative effect of capital controls
on foreign investment.  In other words, the earlier observation is not robust.  In Column 5,
both interactive terms are put together in the regression.  The result is essentially the same
4Other  threshold  values  (5 and 7) were tried and did not make a qualitative  difference  for the subsequent
discussion.
8as before; there is no statistically significant support for the "grease-payment" argument on
either the effect of tax or on that of capital controls.
Table  2: Tax, Capital  Control,  Corruption  and FDI
(Modified Tobit, with continuously measured corruption and capital controls)
Dependent variable: log(stock of FDI from i to j in 1991 + A)
Tax-rate  -1.92*  -1.06*  -1.16#  -0.74##  -0.60
(0.47)  (0.46)  (0.70)  (0.47)  (0.78)
Corruption (BI-index)  -0.09*  -0.05*  -0.07  -0.12*  -0.1 1#
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.05)
Capital Control (BI-index)  -0.14*  J3.13*  -0.23*  -0.22*
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.07)
Corruption x tax-rate  0.05  -0.044
(0.18)  (0.200)
Conuption x capital control  0.021*  0.020*
(0.010)  (0.010)
log(GDPj)  0.54*  0.50*  0.49*  0.46*  0.45*
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)
log(Distance_ij)  -0.28*  -0.30*  -0.29*  -0.29*  -0.29*
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)
Linguistic tie  0.70*  0.70*  0.67*  0.66*  0.64*
(0.28)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.26)
Constant  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*
(3.0)  (4.4)  (2.6)  (2.8)  (2.4)
A  6.3E+9*  6.2E+9*  6.4E+9*  6.4E+9*  6.6E+9*
(6.4E+6)  (2.2E+7)  (5.2E+6)  (9.OE+6)  (2.3E+6)
C  1.16*  1.15*  1.11*  1.12*  1.10*
(0.18)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.17)
Source
Dummies?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Number obs.  545  545  545  545  545
LogLikelihood  1,789.32  1,792.20  1,802.13  1,802.92  1,808.24
*, # and  ##  denote  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  five,  ten  and  fifteen percent levels, respectively.
Note:  1. Eicker-White standard errors that are computed from analytic first and second derivatives are in
parentheses.  All reported coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 103.
2.  "Corruption" and "Capital Controls" equal to 11 minus the corresponding BI-indexes, so that larger
numbers mean more corruption or more capital controls.
3.  Each column represents the result of  a regression that is based on the  following modified  Tobit
specification:
ln(FDIij +  A) = XJ +  u j  if Xfl +  ui  > ln(A)  ='ln(A)  if X± +  uij < ln(A)
where A is a threshold parameter to be estimated. u is an i.i.d. nornal variate with mean zero and variance c
2 .
9Table  3: Binary Measures  of Corruption  and Capital  Controls
(Modified Tobit)
Dependent variable: log(stock of FDI from i toj  in 1991 + A)
Tax-rate  -2.12*  -1.01*  -0.95*  -0.91*  -0.84*
(0.43)  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.39)  (0.40)
D(Corruption)  -0.30*  -0.20*  0.33  -0.37*  0.13
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.65)  (0.18)  (0.06)
D(Cap-Control)  -0.13*  -0.14*  -0.14*  -0.14*
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)
D(Corruption) x tax Tate  -1.61  -1.45
(2.65)  (1.86)
D(Corruption) x D(Cap-Control)  0.044  0.041
(0.044)  (0.042)
log(GDPj)  0.51*  0.44*  0.43*  0.42*  0.41*
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)
log(Distance_ij)  -0.26*  -0.27*  -0.26*  -0.26*  -0.25*
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)
Linguistic tie  0.65*  0.61*  0.61*  0.59*  0.58*
(0.25)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.23)
Constant  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*
(3.6)  (4.4)  (4.9)  (2.4)  (2.1)
A  7.1E+9*  7.3E+9*  7.4E+9*  7.5E+9*  7.7E+9*
(1.9E+7)  (0.6E+7)  (3.3E+7)  (6.3E+6)  (2.1E+6)
a  1.01*  0.99*  0.97*  0.97*  0.94*
(0.16)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)
Source
Dunmmies?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Number obs.  545  545  545  545  545
LogLikelihood  1,829.38  1,847.23  1,849.34  1,854.82  1,859.62
Note: 1. See footnote to Table 2.
2. "D(Corruption)" and "D(Cap-Control)" are dummies for host countries that are highly corrupt, or with
severe capital account restrictions, respectively. D(Corruption) =1 if BI-corruption Index > 6 and 0 otherwise.
D(Cap-Control) =1 if BI-capital control Index > 6 and 0 otherwise.
Additional Controls
To check for robustness with regard to our inference on the validity of the "grease-
payment" argument, I add some further control variables. The results are reported in Table
4.
The first column of Table 4 adds a measure of political stability in the host countries.
Not surprisingly, more stable regimes attract more investment. Note that our conclusion on
the interactions between corruption and tax, and between corruption and capital controls
remains true; there is no support for the "grease-payment" argument.
The second column adds a measure of red tape or bureaucracy in the host countries.
While the new variable has a negative sign, as consistent with one's  intuition, it is not
different from zero statistically.
The last column adds average hourly wage in host countries' manufacturing sectors as
well as a dummy for OECD host countries. Because the wage data is available for a smaller
number of countries, this change cuts down the sample size considerably.  As it turns out,
the OECD dummy is positive and significant: OECD hosts attract more FDI, other things
10being equal.  The wage variable has a negative and significant coefficient; countries with
lower labor costs also attract more FDI.  Controlling for these effects, there is still no support
for the validity of the "grease-payment" hypothesis.
Table 4: More Robustness Checks
(Modified  Tobit,  Binary  measures  of corruption  and capital  controls)
Dependent  variable:  log(stock  of FDI from i to  j in 1991  + A)
Tax-rate  -0.77#  -0.74#  -1.07*
(0.40)  (0.41)  (0.45)
D(Corruption)  0.76  0.74  1.11#
(0.70)  (0.69)  (0.07)
D(Cap-Control)  -0.13*  -0.12*  -0.11*
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)
D(Corruption)  x tax-rate  -3.00##  -2.89  -3.63#
(2.07)  (2.03)  (1.96)
D(Corruption)  x D(Cap-Control)  0.056  0.053  0.044
(0.043)  (0.043)  (0.046)
Political  stability  0.10*  0.09#  0.12*
Red tape  -0.01  0.07#
(0.03)  (0.04)




Log(GDPj)  0.41*  0.40*  0.40*
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)
Log(Distanceij)  -0.25*  -0.25*  4-.25*
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)
Linguistic  tie  0.60*  0.56*  0.59*
(0.23)  (0.28)  (0.22)
Constant  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*  1.6E+4*
(2.5)  (2.5)  (2.3)
A  7.6E+9*  7.7E+9*  8.5E+9*
(5.7E+6)  (6.2E+6)  (4.5E+6)
CT  0.96*  0.94*  0.91*
(0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)
Source
Dummies?  yes  yes  yes
Number  obs.  545  545  450
LogLikelihood  1,860.02  1,867.71  1,627.73
Note: See  notes  to Table  3. "Red  Tape"  equal  to 11  minus  the corresponding  BI-index,  so  that larger  numbers
mean more  red tapes.
Subsequent regressions experiment with adding:  (1) foreign firms'  access to domestic
capital markets, (2) foreign firms' ability to set up joint ventures with domestic firms, (3)
foreign firms' ability to bid on public sector projects, and (4) foreign firms' ability to exert
corporate  control  rights.  The  four  dummies  are  all  survey  responses  of  subjective
perceptions from the 1997 Global Competitiveness  Report. As it happens, the four dummies
are highly correlated.  If all  four are put  into the regression,  none  has  a  coefficient
statistically different from zero. Moreover, the earlier conclusions regarding the effects on
FDI of tax rates, corruption levels, and capital controls, as well as their interactions, remain
the same.  If one adds only one of the four dummies, say, foreign firms'  access to domestic
11capital markets,  this variable does have a  statistically significant coefficient.  Greater
restrictions on access to domestic capital leads to less foreign investment. [The regression
results not reported.]
Section 4: Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the effects of corruption, tax rates and capital on the ability of
host countries to attract foreign direct investment. It reaches two main conclusions. First,
in isolation, each of the three factors has a negative effect on inward investrnent: Countries
with higher tax rates, or more corruption,  or more restrictions on capital account transactions,
attract less foreign investment, other things being equal.
Second, the three factors could interact with each other and produce a complicated
aggregate effect.  In particular, it is sometimes argued that corruption may allow finns to
evade excessive taxation and severe capital account restrictions  (the "grease-payment"
argument) and thereby actually encourage investment. In the data, there is no support for the
view that taxation has a smaller negative effect on foreign investment in a more corrupt host
country.  With regard to capital controls, there is some support for the view that corruption
may reduce the burden of severe capital controls when a 10-step measure of the control is
used.  However, this result is not robust to the use of dummy variables to separate high
corruption from low corruption, and severe capital controls from mild capital controls.
Hence, the data does not support the "efficient grease payments" argument.
In short, the evidence indicates that taxes and capital controls are hindrance to foreign
investment.  Bureaucratic corruption adds rather than relieves the burdens that they
impose.
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